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The Swiss franc exchange rate and deviations from uncovered
interest parity: global vs domestic factors
Abstract
We examine the role of global and country-specific factors for the Swiss franc exchange rate in the
period 1990-2009. Simple asset pricing theory would predict that exchange rates reflect relative
movements in national discount factors and that systematic departures from uncovered interest parity
can only be explained by international differences in the exposure to the common (global) component of
all national discount factors. We extend the methodology of LUSTIG, ROUSSANOV and
VERDELHAN (2009) to allow individual currencies' exposure to this global factor to vary over time as
a function of the interest rate differential. This allows us to study the time-varying risk characteristics of
individual currency pairs. We find that the Swiss franc acts as a safe haven against some currencies -
notably for dollar-based investors - but not for all, specifically not the euro. Also, the extent to which
global factors have weighed on the Swiss franc exchange rate has varied over the sample period and
appears more subdued in the global low interest rate environment of the last decade.
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1. Introduction
The 10th anniversary of the new monetary policy framework of the SNB is a 
good opportunity to look at the changing role of the Swiss franc as an interna-
tional currency. The last decade was characterized by tidal change around the 
world, including catastrophic turmoil (Sept. 11th attacks), major transforma-
tions of the international financial system (such as the creation of the euro) and 
an (until recently) continued decrease in macroeconomic volatility. All of these 
developments could plausibly have affected the classical role of the Swiss franc 
as a safe haven. Whether the franc is a safe haven clearly has major implications 
from the point of view of monetary policy making: in a small open economy 
such as Switzerland, variation in the nominal exchange rate is an important factor 
in determining domestic inflation (see R, 2008). To what extent monetary 
policy can impact the exchange rate if needed is therefore a crucial determinant 
of its effectiveness. A safe haven currency is likely to be buffeted mainly by global 
factors in times of worldwide turbulence which could limit the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. This paper explores the relative role of global and country-spe-
cific factors in the Swiss franc exchange rate. Specifically we seek to understand 
if the impact of global shocks on the bilateral Swiss franc exchange rate vis-à-
vis major currencies has been varying over time – possibly leading to safe haven 
behavior – and what the  factors driving this variation may be.
 H / S
1 Since the safe have phenomenon is inextricably linked to currency risk premia, this may also 
help explain the sparsity of this particular branch of the literature.
Academic research dedicated to the save haven phenomenon is relatively sparse. 
R and S (2008) is one of the few recent contributions that have 
systematically sought to identify safe haven characteristics in a cross-section of 
major currencies. They conclude that the Swiss franc, the yen, and to a limited 
extent also the euro display safe haven characteristics while the dollar and the 
pound show no such behaviour.
In a series of recent papers, K and W (2004, 2005) have docu-
mented what they call the Swiss interest rate puzzle, the fact that excess returns 
on the Swiss franc over the last seventy years are persistently negative, marking 
a gross violation of uncovered interest parity. They ascribe this pattern to a peso 
problem, i.e. to safe haven characteristics but conclude (in W and K, 
2009) that evidence for a Swiss interest rate island (K and W, 2002) 
is much less clear-cut in the last ten years than it used to be before. This is an 
important point of departure for our analysis: the first ten years of the new oper-
ating framework coincide with this “disappearance of the island”.  It is therefore 
a timely question to ask whether the safe haven characteristic has disappeared 
for good or whether the strength of the phenomenon could itself be time vary-
ing and dependent on the global environment.
L and S (2009) examine the role of monetary policy shocks for the 
determination of the Swiss Franc exchange rate in a structural VAR framework. 
They do not explicitly distinguish between global and county-specific shocks to 
the exchange rate but, consistent with our conjecture here, they find that the rela-
tive contribution of monetary policy shocks has been varying over time.
Until recently, the notion that departures from uncovered interest parity could 
be driven by currency risk premia was viewed with considerable skepticism by 
many in the economics profession (see the survey by E, 1996).1 The seminal 
work by L and V (2007) has helped to initiate a gradual change 
of this view. Lustig and Verdelhan argue that excess returns on currency port-
folios that are formed on the size of the interest rate differential towards the US 
dollar can be explained by a version of the consumption-based capital asset pric-
ing model. In more recent work, L, R and V (2009) 
(henceforth LRV) propose a linear factor model in which the spread between 
the return on the highest and lowest interest rate portfolios – a global carry 
trade factor – helps explain a significant share in the cross-sectional variation of 
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currency returns. We interpret a currency’s exposure to this factor as a measure 
of a currency’s global or ‘safe haven’ component. As in LRV we argue that cross-
country differences in the exposure to the global factor can help explain differ-
ences in the size of the departure from uncovered interest parity (UIP). Different 
from LRV however, our focus is on single currency pairs (and not on currency 
portfolios) and we allow the strength of a currency’s exposure to the global factor 
to vary over time as a function of the interest rate differential. We apply this 
framework to monthly exchange rates and interest rate differentials for the Swiss 
franc vis-à-vis five other major currencies – the US dollar, the Canadian dollar, 
the Deuschmark/euro, the Japanese yen and the British pound – over the period 
1990:6–2009:4. Our main results are as follows:
Over the last twenty years, the Swiss franc has displayed safe haven charac-
teristics in its behaviour vis-à-vis the US and Canadian dollar and the pound. 
It has not played such a role vis-à-vis the euro and the Japanese yen. As regards 
the euro, this may be explained by the rise of the single European currency as a 
major international and reserve currency itself. As regards the yen, our findings 
could be explained by the fact that next to the franc, the yen is another preferred 
funding currency in the global carry trade.
However, the safe haven characteristic – and with it the role of global factors 
for the exchange rate – has varied considerably over the sample period. Global 
factors were important in some episodes – specifically during the late 1990s (the 
Asian crisis and its aftermath) – and have proven to be very persistent for the 
average valuation of the Swiss franc against other currencies. But the exposure 
of the Swiss currency to global shocks appeared somewhat more subdued over 
the best part of the last ten years. Our analytical framework allows an interpre-
tation of this fact: in our setup, differences in the exposure to global shocks are 
reflected in interest rate differentials. The globally low interest rate environ-
ment of the last decade has substantially mitigated differences in the exposure 
to global shocks among the major currencies studied here. However, sufficiently 
large global shocks could again lead to considerable cross-country heterogeneity 
in the responses to such shocks in the future. This in turn could quickly revive 
safe haven behavior in individual currency pairs and may suggest that the safe 
haven property is actually latent. The appreciation of the franc in the aftermath 
of the subprime crises seems to support this view – the Swiss interest rate island 
may have temporarily disappeared only because economic conditions were glo-
bally benign.
Here is the outline of the remainder of this paper: in the next section we adapt 
the framework of L, R and V (2009) to discuss the 
relative role of global and country-specific factors in explaining the Swiss franc 
 H / S
2 Since our interest is mainly in short-term fluctuations in the exchange rate, we use the nomi-
nal version of this condition, ignoring inflation differentials.
exchange rate. In Section 3 follows a discussion of the data set, Section 4 presents 
the empirical results. Section 5 provides some further discussion of our findings 
and concludes.
2. Global and Country-Specific Factors in Currency Returns
We start by presenting a simplified version of the framework by L, R-
 and V (2009) and then adapt it to study the dynamics of the 
Swiss franc exchange rate. Our point of departure is the recognition that in com-
plete financial markets, the exchange rate change is the difference between the 
(logarithmic) home and foreign discount factors:
 1 1 1
kh h k
t t ts m m+ + +∆ = −  (1)
where 1
kh
ts +∆  is the rate of change of the spot exchange rate measured in units of 
foreign (country k) currency per unit of home currency and mh(mk) denotes the 
logarithmic home (foreign) discount factor.2 We can think of differences between 
home and foreign discount factors as the outcome of frictions and goods mar-
kets (e.g. the presence of notradeable goods as in B and S, 1993) that, 
however, do not reflect a failure to share financial risk. We posit the existence of 
a linear factor structure for the cross-section of national discount factors
 1 1 1
h h
t h t tm g cα+ + += +  (2)
 1 1 1
k k
t k t tm g cα+ + += +  (3)
where gt+1 is the global factor and c
h and ck are country-specific disturbances 
orthogonal to g.
Define the excess return on currency k over currency h as
 1 1
kh k h kh
t t t trx i i s+ += − −∆  (4)
This is the (foreign currency k) return that an investor residing in k will reap 
from a carry trade strategy that goes short in our home currency (h) and long 
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3 Here we have used that
  1 1 1 1
/ # ( ) / #
kh h k
t h I t t ts I g c c Iα α+ + + +∆ = − + −∑ ∑
 and the two assumptions that 
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1
/ # 0
k
tk I
c I
+∈
→∑  for #I large enough and
 ii) that the variances of the idiosyncratic components c are equal across countries.
in his own foreign currency (k). Recognize that the interest rate is given by the 
negative expected (logarithmic) discount factor:
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 (6)
L, R and V (2009) then sort currencies (at each point 
in time) into five different portfolios I = 1,…,5 by the size of their interest rate dif-
ferential towards the US dollar. Provided there is a sufficient number of currencies 
in each portfolio, averaging excess returns across portfolio currencies eliminates 
the idiosyncratic shocks so that the average excess return on portfolio I is
 
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1
( )
#
( )
( )( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
2
I k h kh
t t t t
k I
h hh I
h I t t t t t t
rx i i s
I
g g var g c c
α α
α α
+ +
∈
+ + + + +
= − −∆
−
= − − + − −
∑
E E
 (7)
where #I denotes the number of currencies in portfolio I and where we denote 
with
 
1
#
I kk II
α α
∈
= ∑
the average loading of the global factor for the currencies in that portfolio.3
 H / S
Three facts are noteworthy from equation (7). The first is that – since g is 
uncorrelated with c by assumption – the global factor should only be priced into 
portfolio I if the home country and the average country in I differ in terms of 
their exposure to the global factor, i.e. if αh ≠ αI. Hence, differences in the expo-
sure to the global factor determine the cross-section of currency returns.
Secondly, the difference in exposures, αh − αI, is directly linked to the size of 
the interest rate differential: for a portfolio with sufficiently many currencies, rxI 
will not depend on ck for k ≠ h. Therefore, only differences in the loadings of the 
global factor are left to determine interest rate differentials. Currency portfolios 
with relatively high interest rates have higher loadings on the global factor.
The third fact is that the above representation allows to make shocks to the 
global factor (and to its variability) observable. To see this, note that whenever 
we take the difference in excess returns between two arbitrary portfolios I1 and 
I2, the country-specific shock 1 1( ( ))
h h
t tc c+ +−E  will cancel out. Specifically, LRV 
suggest to look at the difference between the portfolio with the highest and the 
lowest interest rate differential and call this the HMLFX factor:
 
1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1
( )
( )( ( )) ( )
2
FX high low
t t t
low high
low high t t t t t
HML rx rx
g g var g
α α
α α
+ + +
+ + +
= −
−
= − − +E
 (8)
which is now free of any country-specific influences. Shocks to this factor are 
then given by
 1 1 1 1( ) ( )( ( ))
FX FX
t t t low high t t tHML HML g gα α+ + + +− = − −E E  (9)
so that we obtain a beta-representation for the excess return on portfolio I of 
the form:
 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ( )) ( )
I I I FX FX h h
t t t HML t t t t trx rx HML HML c cβ+ + + + + +− = − − +E E E  (10)
 where  I h IHML
low high
α α
β
α α
−
=
−
In contrast to LRV, in this paper we are interested in studying the exposure of 
individual currency pairs to global and country-specific factors. Since the inter-
est rate differential for individual currency pairs changes over time, so should 
the exposure to the global factor. Hence, a fixed beta representation such as (8) 
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4 Specifically, the domestic factor is the residual of the regression 
  
#1 11 1( )
h h FX FX
t tt t t trx i i HML HML rxα β β+ ++ += + − + +
 where ti  is the average of of all foreign interest rates and 1
FX
tHML +  is normalized by its sample 
standard deviation.
will not generally exist for individual currency pairs. Rather, the beta for the 
individual currency pair k,h should be a function of the interest rate differential. 
We therefore specify
 1 2( 1) ( )
kh kh k h kh
HML t tt i iβ β β+ = − +  (11)
which gives us the following time-varying beta representation
 1 1 1 2 1 1 1( )
kh kh k h FX kh FX h
t t t t t h t trx a i i HML HML cβ β β ε+ + + + += + − + + +  (12)
for each currency pair k,h where we include a constant a to capture the com-
pounded effect of the expectation terms, which we assume to be time invariant. 
We include a residual, εt+1, to account for any purely idiosyncratic influences on 
currency pair k,h as well as for possible measurement error (e.g. due to differences 
in the sampling interval of the interest rate and the exchange rate in our data).
In order to turn this relation into a regression equation, we need an estimate of 
the idiosyncratic component, 1.
h
tc +  To obtain this estimate, note that the average 
excess return of country h vis-à-vis all other K − 1 currencies is given by
 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
( )
( )( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
2
h hh
t h t t t t t trx g g var g c c
α α
α α
+ + + + + +
−
= − − + − −E E  (13)
where α  is the cross-sectional average of the global factor loadings. LRV assume 
that the home country has the same loading on the global factor as the average 
country in the sample so that ( ) = 0.hα α−  In this case, 1trx +  directly identifies 
the country-specific component. Clearly, the assumption ( ) = 0hα α−  cannot 
be satisfied for all countries in the sample unless all countries have the same 
loading, in which case, however, the global factor would not be priced into cur-
rency returns at all. In particular, for a country like Switzerland – a potential 
safe haven – this assumption would not seem to make sense. We therefore con-
struct the country-specific factor by, in addition, regressing 1trx +  on 1
FX
tHML +  and 
its interaction with the interest rate differential.4 The residual of this regression 
 H / S
will be naturally orthogonal to HMLFX and will therefore only contain 1.
h
tc +  We 
refer to this orthogonalized country-specific factor as # 1.trx +  The regression we 
effectively estimate therefore has the form:
 # 11 1 1 2 1 1( )
hkh kh k h FX kh FX
tt t t t t h trx a i i HML HML rxβ β β ε++ + + += + − + + +  (14)
This representation now allows us to address all the issues we wish to study. First, 
it offers a decomposition of the return on currency pair k,h into a domestic com-
ponent # 1( )
h
trx +  and a global component 1 1 2 1( ( ) ).
kh k h FX kh FX
t t t ti i HML HMLβ β+ +− +  Sec-
ondly, the representation of the global component allows for time-varying hedg-
ing properties of the currency pair , 1 1 2( ( ) ),
kh kh k h kh
HML t t ti iβ β β+ = − +  so that the 
strength of the quantity of aggregate risk associated with a carry strategy in cur-
rency pair k,h is directly dependent on the interest rate differential. Conversely, 
for a given interest rate differential, currencies may still differ in their hedging 
characteristics because the coefficients 1 2,
kh khβ β  could be different for different 
countries.
We now apply this framework to the Swiss franc exchange rate. Before we move 
on to discuss our data set and empirical implementation, some general remarks 
may help to illustrate the use of the framework.
We conjecture that the role of the Swiss franc as a safe haven has been 
time-varying. A safe haven currency offers a foreign investor a high return 
in times of global turbulence. Since HMLFX decreases in bad times and 
since rxkh is expressed in the foreign investor’s (k) own currency, this implies 
that 1 2( 1) ( )
kh kh k h kh
HML t tt i iβ β β+ = − +  should turn positive in bad times. We 
explore this possibility below.
Note also that the sensitivity of the safe haven property to the interest differ-
ential will depend on the slope coefficient 2 .
khβ  For example, in a globally low 
interest rate environment as we have experienced it over the last decade, interest 
rate differentials will tend to be very compressed. This may lead a researcher to 
conclude that the safe haven property of a given currency is no longer apparent or 
has vanished altogether (see for example K and W, 2009). However, 
it could be that minor changes in interest rate differentials may lead to very dif-
ferent reactions in returns across currencies simply because country pairs differ 
in the sensitivity coefficient 2 .
khβ  We think that this is one possible way to cap-
ture what R and S (2008) have called the latent characteristic 
of the safe haven property. We now turn to our empirical analysis.
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5 The data on the global risk factor can be downloaded at http://web.mit.edu/adrienv/www/
CurrencyPortfolios.xls. We use the data on “all currencies’’.
6 For further details about the construction of currency portfolios see L, R and 
V (2009). include the following footnote here:
3. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on a data set that includes monthly data on 
nominal interest rates, bilateral spot exchange rates and the global currency risk 
factor HMLFX for Switzerland, the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany and 
the United Kingdom. Exchange rates and interest rates are sourced from the July 
2009 issue of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The exchange rates are 
end of month dollar exchange rates (line 132) and interest rates are end of month 
money market rates (line 60). We use the global currency risk factor HMLFX as 
constructed by L, R and V (2009).5 After having sorted 
currencies on their interest rate info five portfolios, the HMLFX factor reflects 
the carry trade return that an US investor gains from going short in the lowest 
interest rate portfolio and long in the highest interest rate portfolio.6 The sample 
period starts in June 1990 and ends in April 2009.
4. Empirical Results
Our theoretical analysis so far has focussed on returns. From a monetary policy 
perspective however, the interest may be more on medium to longer-term move-
ments in the exchange rate. Figure 1 therefore provides an impression of the cumu-
lative impact of return shocks on the level of the exchange rate. The Figure plots 
the cumulated average change of the nominal Swiss franc exchange rate against 
all five major currencies, and compares this to the cumulated changes in the Swiss 
franc domestic component # 1.trx +  The difference between the two lines gives an 
impression to what extent global factors can explain changes in the multilateral 
Swiss franc nominal exchange rate since the beginning of our sample period. If 
variation in the exchange rate was driven by the domestic component only, the 
two lines should be identical. However, as is apparent, there is considerable vari-
ation over time in the relative role of global and domestic influences. Whereas 
in the early part of the period, the exchange rate of the Swiss franc seems to have 
been explained well by domestic factors, global factors make a huge impact in 
the late 1990s: as the graph suggests, these global factors pesistently increased 
the average valuation of the Swiss franc by up to 15 percent relative to the purely 
domestic component.
 H / S
Figure 2 shows the impact of the global factor HMLFX on the return of a port-
folio that goes short in Swiss franc and long (in equal weights) in all the other 
major currencies. From the way in which #rx  was constructed, recall that the dif-
ference between rx  and #rx  gives this impact of the global factor, weighted with 
the average interest rate differential across all currencies:
 #1 1 1 1 2 1( )
FX h FX
t t t t t trx rx HML i i HMLβ β+ + + +− = + −  (15)
where i  is the average interest rate in the other countries. In this graph, starting 
in 1990:6, we also indicate a sequence of major geopolitical events, natural dis-
asters and economic crises that we take and update from R and S-
 (2008). As is clearly apparent, #rx rx−  experiences strong negative shocks 
during some events but not during all. For example, the reaction to September 
11th and other geopolitical and natural disaster events is relatively muted, whereas 
there is a strong reaction during economic crises, notably the Asian crisis and its 
Figure 1. Multilateral Swiss Franc Exchange Rate versus Domestic Component
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The blue line graphs the cumulated average change of the Swiss franc exchange rate against all 
five major currencies. The red line graphs the cumulated change of the Swiss franc domestic com-
ponent # 1.trx +
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aftermath (including the Russian default and LTCM), the 2000 stock market 
crash. The franc also loads on the global shocks of the recent sub prime crisis 
(Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers), but the effect is 
dwarfed by the events of the late 1990s. In all these economic events, however, a 
carry trade portfolio short in Swiss francs would have done very badly, suggest-
ing that the Swiss franc has indeed played a role as a safe haven in the aftermath 
of these events.
Figure 2: Average Global Return Component and Global Events
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The blue graph is the global return component, constructed as described in the text: 
#1 1 1 1 2 1( ) ( ) .
h FX FX
t t t t t ti HML HMLrx rx iβ β+ + + +− = − +
The dashed vertical lines mark the global events listed below.
1: Tequila peso crisis (1994:12) 2: East Asian Financial Crisis (1997:07) 3: Global stock market 
crash (1997:10) 4: Russian financial crisis (1998:03) 5: Dot-com bubble burst (2000:03) 6: 2001 
Atlantic hurricane (2001:06) 7: WTC terrorist attacks (2001:09) 8: Accounting scandals (Enron) 
(2001:12) 9: SARS (2002:11) 10: Second Gulf War (2003:03) 11: Tsunami (2004:12) 12: London 
bombings (2005:07) 13: Hurricane Katarina (2005:08) 14: Lebanon War (2006:07) 15: Sell-off of 
Chinese shares (2007:02) 16: Bear Stearns bankruptcy (2007:08) 17: Total write downs on MBS 
reach 435 billion US-$, Indy Mac failure, Freddie and Fannie in crisis, Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (2008:07) 18: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (2008:09).
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Figure 3: Bilateral Exchange Rate versus Cumulated Global Component
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The blue line graphs bilateral spot exchange rates as deviations from their mean, the red graph 
plots the cumulated deviation of the global component from its mean. The global component is 
the fitted values of the global part in our baseline regression (1):
1 1 2 1
( ) .
kh k h FX kh FX
t t t ti i HML HMLβ β+ +− +
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Figures 1 and 2 mask considerable differences across currency pairs. This 
becomes clear from Figure 3 which looks at the role of the global component in 
explaining departures of bilateral exchange rates from their mean. The global 
component plotted in this figure is the cumulated deviation of the fitted global 
part of our baseline regression (14) from its mean. The exchange rates vis-à-
vis Canada, the UK and Japan seems most clearly explained by global factors. 
Given that both the Swiss franc and the yen are preferred funding currencies in 
the global carry trade, it may not be surprsing that in particular the yen-franc 
exchange rate should be very sensitive to fluctuations in global conditions. The 
Swiss franc US dollar exchange rate seems strongly influenced by global factors in 
the first half of our sample period but much less so in the last decade. The same 
is true for the Deutschmark (euro) exchange rate which could be a signal of the 
rising role of the euro as a reserve and safe haven currency itself.
Figure 4, quite in analogy to Figure 2, gives the global component for individ-
ual currency returns. Again it is the case that most major crisis events load very 
differently on different currency pairs. For example, the reaction of the exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the US dollar to the 2007/2008 financial crisis seems relatively 
muted. The same is true for the euro-to-franc exchange rate which hardly seems 
to react to global shocks at all. Conversely, the crisis loads much more heavily on 
the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the yen and sterling.
The first column of Table 1A reports the results for the baseline regression (14) 
for the period 1990:6 till 2009:4. In addition, the global factor is normalized by 
its sample standard deviation. Note first that the domestic factor is significant 
throughout, even though the exposure of individual currency pairs again varies 
a lot across countries. More importantly, the beta on the interaction between the 
interest rate and the global factor, HMLFX, is highly significant and positive for 
Switzerland vis-à-vis the US and Canada. This suggests that a low interest rate 
in Switzerland would indeed be indicative of the Swiss franc acting as safe haven 
for investors based in these countries.
Conversely, the estimate of 1
khβ  is insignificant vis-à-vis Germany/the euro, the 
United Kingdom and Japan, suggesting that the interest rate differential does not 
provide a strong signal as to the safe haven properties of the franc vis-à-vis these 
currencies. However, the UK is the only country for which 2
khβ  is positively sig-
nificant, i.e. it is the only country for which a safe haven property seems appar-
ent independently of the interest rate differential.
While we have seen that a low interest rate on the Swiss franc indicates that 
the Swiss franc serves as a hedge vis-à-vis at least some of these currencies (nota-
bly the dollar), the role of the franc is not unique in this respect. Columns 2–5 
of Table 1A provide the results of our basic regression when the other countries 
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Figure 4: Global Return Components and Global Events
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The blue graph plots the global component as described in the notes of Figure 3, the dashed verti-
cal lines mark the same global events as described in the notes of Figure 2.
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are used as the reference countries. As is apparent, 
1
khβ  is significant and posi-
tive in a number of cases, notably for the euro-to-US-dollar exchange rate, the 
pound/dollar and the Canadian dollar vs. the euro.
The results in Table 1A suggest that the safe haven property is a) a priori a fea-
ture of individual currency pairs rather than of an individual currency, and b) that 
the safe haven property is time varying with the interest rate differential acting 
as a powerful indicator for the strength and sign of the exposure to the global 
factor. This latter observation has an important implication for the detectabil-
ity of safe haven behaviour: in an environment with globally low interest rates, 
interest rate differentials will also be small and the safe haven effect may appear 
very subdued – even in periods of increased global volatility. In the context of our 
model, the rationale for this pattern is simple: for a foreign investor, the hedging 
characteristics of a currency depends on how different the country’s exposure to 
global shocks is from that of other countries, and the interest rate differential is an 
indicator of this exposure differential. If the expected exposure to global shocks 
differs little across countries, then safe haven behaviour in individual currency 
pairs should not be very strong. However, it may still be the case that former pat-
terns of safe haven behavior manifest themselves again, once international dif-
ferences in the exposure to global shocks start to widen.
To show that what we are picking up in our baseline regression is really 
related to variation in exchange rates (and therefore to currency risk) and not 
to some correlation between the interest rate differentials, Table 1B repeats the 
exercise from Table 1A, but now with the negative of bilateral exchange rate 
changes, , 1,
k h
ts +−∆  as the dependent variable. The results stay qualitatively very 
much the same: the sensitivity to the interest rate differential is significant and 
positive for the US, Canada, almost significant for Japan and insignificant for 
the UK and Germany. For the UK, however, 2 ,
hkβ  the average level of exposure, 
is significantly positive.
As we have argued before, the time-varying beta with respect to HMLFX
 1 2( 1) ( )
kh kh k h kh
HML t tt i iβ β β+ = − +  (16)
can be interpreted as a safe haven index: in periods when ( 1)khHML tβ +  is positive, 
the franc is a safe haven for country k investors, when it is negative, foreign inves-
tors buy additional global risk with their Swiss franc investment. We plot this 
index in Figure 5, based on the estimates of 1
khβ  and 2
khβ  from Table 1A. Over 
the sample period, exposure to the global factor has varied most strongly vis-à-vis 
the US and Canadian dollars and the yen. For these countries, the index actu-
ally also changes sign, indicating that the role of the Swiss franc as a safe haven 
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Figure 5. Bilateral Safe Haven Index and Global Events
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The blue graph plots the save haven index 
1 2
( 1) ( ) ,
kh kh k h kh
HML t tt i iβ β β+ = − +  where 1
khβ  and 
2
khβ  are 
the estimated regression coefficients of the baseline regression in Table 1A. The dashed vertical 
lines mark the global events described in the notes of Figure 2.
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is actually time varying. Vis-à-vis the yen, the index is actually negative for most 
of the period. For both Germany and – to a somewhat lesser extent – the UK 
the index is much more stable. For both of these economies it is also positive 
throughout but generally close to zero.
4.1 Extensions and Robustness: Market Volatility and Other Pricing Factors
One important extension of our result here is to allow the volatility of HMLFX to 
vary over time. Note from equation (8) that HMLFX depends on the volatility of 
the global factor g. Changes in var(gt+1) will therefore directly affect 1
FX
tHML +  and 
visual inspection, e.g. of Figure 2, suggests that the volatility of HMLFX may 
indeed have been varying over time. We explore possible implications of this 
observation next.
As a first exercise, we estimate a GARCH process for HMLFX and included 
the ensuing fitted volatility – to which we refer as h2 – as a third pricing factor 
into our model (besides HMLFX and its interaction with the interest rate differ-
ential). The factor h2 is never significant and the coefficients on HMLFX and the 
interaction with the interest rate differential remain largely unchanged vis-à-vis 
our baseline specifications.
As a second exercise, we run a regression of HMLFX on h2. Note from 
equation (8) that if 2th  is a proxy of 1( ),t tvar g +  then the fitted value of this 
regression corresponds to 1( )
FX
t tHML +E  and the residual identifies the global 
shock, 1 1( ).
FX FX
t t tHML HML+ +−E  We therefore use this residual (instead of HML
FX 
itself) in our conditional-beta specification (14). Again, the results are similar 
to the ones obtained from the baseline specification.
Note that these findings do not imply that h2 is constant. Quite to the con-
trary – the volatility of HMLFX is time-varying and displays a positive correlation 
with extant volatility indexes. Our discussants (M G (2010) and 
R (2010), both this issue) have more to say on this point and we agree with 
most of their suggestions. What we can conclude from the exercises here, how-
ever, is that explicitly modelling the time-variation in h2 does not help improve 
the identification of shocks to g very much: while changes in volatility may be 
predictable, they may simply not be predictable enough to substantially affect 
the identification of shocks to the global discount factor. That does not mean, 
that the shocks themselves – which are the relevant aspect from an asset pricing 
perspective – are homoskedastic or that these shocks may not in part represent 
volatility shocks. At a more general level, it is therefore important to acknowledge 
that measures of market volatility and many other plausible pricing factors that 
one may want to include in the empirical specifications for currency risk can be 
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nested as special cases within the current framework. The reason for this is that 
the theoretical foundations for HMLFX are parsimonious but very strong, since 
they rest on only two assumptions: a) that markets are complete and b) that inter-
est rates reflect the inverse of the expected discount factor. Clearly, if any of these 
two assumptions is violated, then other factors may be priced independently of 
HMLFX. As our discussants suggest, liquidity risk factors (the very presence of 
which would imply that markets are incomplete) may be one important candi-
date – specifically against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In a small open economy, medium-term exchange rate fluctuations can have a 
direct bearing on domestic inflation. Monetary policy may therefore want to 
offset some shocks to the exchange rate. This objective may be harder to achieve 
if such shocks are largely global in origin. It is therefore important to ask to which 
extent fluctuations in exchange rates are determined by global and domestic fac-
tors. While interesting at a general level, this question attains particular relevance 
in the context of the Swiss franc exchange rate. For the last 70 years, returns on 
debt assets denominated in Swiss francs have experienced a much lower return 
than similar assets in other major currencies. While such violations of uncov-
ered interest parity (UIP) abound in the data for virtually all currencies, it is the 
persistence of this violation in Swiss data that is striking. This stylized fact has 
been dubbed the ‘Swiss interest rate puzzle’ (K and W, 2009) and is 
often ascribed to an inverse peso problem, i.e. an alleged safe haven property of 
the Swiss franc. But the very notion of safe haven implies that movements in the 
nominal exchange rate are dominated by global shocks in terms of crisis. In this 
paper, we have proposed a novel way to identify such global factors in the data.
Our analysis is based on the methodology pioneered by L, R-
 and V (2009). The key insight underlying this approach is that 
exchange rates reflect relative movements in national discount factors. Simple 
asset pricing theory would then predict that systematic excess returns on a cur-
rency can only be explained by international differences in the exposure to the 
common component of all national discount factors. Here, we have extended 
this methodology to allow individual currencies’ exposure to vary over time as 
a function of the interest rate differential. Based on this approach, we have then 
identified global and domestic components in returns on assets denominated in 
Swiss franc. We also have assessed the cumulative impact of these components 
on the level of the exchange rate. Our main results are as follows:
The Swiss Franc Exchange Rate and Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity 
Indeed, the Swiss franc has a tendency to appreciate in times of global eco-
nomic turbulence, but this statement requires several qualifications:
First, the size of global components differ a lot across currency pairings and 
over time. For example, in the recent crisis, the global component has played an 
important role for bilateral exchange rate movements vis-à-vis the yen, the pound 
and the Canadian dollar but – maybe surprisingly – much less vis-à-vis the US 
dollar. Over the last ten years, there is also virtually no global exposure in the 
bilateral euro/franc exchange rate which could partly be explained by the rise of 
the euro as an international currency with similar hedging qualities as the franc 
or with the increased integration of Switzerland into the European economy. Both 
developments could have contributed to dampening differences in the exposure 
to global shocks between the EMU and Switzerland.7
Secondly, the strength of the safe haven characteristics is strongly dependent 
on the size of the interest rate differential, most strongly so vis-à-vis the US and 
Canada. The last ten years have seen a tendency for interest rate differentials to 
become more compressed between the major currencies, reflecting the globally 
low interest rate environment and the continued moderation in macroeconomic 
volatility. In return, the safe haven property of the classical low interest rate cur-
rency Swiss franc may have appeared rather subdued as compared with earlier 
periods. We argue, however, that this does not imply that the safe haven prop-
erty – and with it the Swiss interest rate island – is necessarily gone for good. In 
fact, we document that global factors have proven to be very persistent in terms 
of their effect on the level of the exchange rate and have led to a considerably 
higher average valuation of the Swiss franc vis-à-vis an equally-weighted basket of 
major currencies than would have been justified based on purely country-specific 
influences. We also document that the sensitivity of the exposure to global fac-
tors to changes in the interest rate differential still differs a lot across currencies. 
This suggests that return characteristics of major currencies may diverge again 
in a situation where global shocks lead to very different responses in national dis-
count factors. The appreciation of the franc in the recent crisis seems to support 
this view – the Swiss interest rate island may only have temporarily disappeared 
and may well resurface in the ebb and flow of global economic conditions.
7 The paper was completed well before the breakout of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. In future 
work it will be interesting to assess whether the associated depreciation of the euro against the 
Swiss franc reflects a largely idiosyncratic shock or rather the difference in the exposure of the 
two currencies to the global factor.
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The Swiss Franc Exchange Rate and Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity 
SUMMARY
We examine the role of global and country-specific factors for the Swiss franc 
exchange rate in the period 1990–2009. Simple asset pricing theory would predict 
that exchange rates reflect relative movements in national discount factors and 
that systematic departures from uncovered interest parity can only be explained 
by international differences in the exposure to the common (global) component 
of all national discount factors. We extend the methodology of L, R-
 and V (2009) to allow individual currencies’ exposure to this 
global factor to vary over time as a function of the interest rate differential. This 
allows us to study the time-varying risk characteristics of individual currency 
pairs. We find that the Swiss franc acts as a safe haven against some currencies – 
notably for dollar-based investors – but not for all, specifically not the euro. Also, 
the extent to which global factors have weighed on the Swiss franc exchange rate 
has varied over the sample period and appears more subdued in the global low 
interest rate environment of the last decade.
